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Abstract: Adrian Gargett, in his paper "Nolan's Memento, Memory, and Recognition," analyses 
Christopher Nolan's film Memento. Gargett employs Deleuzian film theory in a general considera-
tion of the relationship between thought and film. Gargett proposes that Memento acts as a type 
of intellectual stimulant that has the viewer deciphering a puzzle in process: what is identified in 
Memento is the way in which memory and the work of memory are presented in the film's narra-
tive construct. In his analysis Gargett argues that memory is not added on; rather, it is already 
present, and that the Deleuzian abstract quality does not lie in the negative relation to representa-
tion, externality, and figure. And it is there in the way memory is present: abstraction is not pre-
sent simply because memory lacks a given determination, and thus all that is apparent in the film 
is memory in the abstract. Abstraction here means a particular type of filmic presentation and it is 
the employment of abstraction as an already determined form of film construction. This presenta-
tion and what allows the film to be abstract is the confrontation with the conventions of abstrac-
tion. Engaging with abstraction within abstraction must be understood in terms of the construction 
and in terms of a response to the construction/structure of the film, in which narrative/subject 
matter can only be identified with their emergence from the way in which particular sequenc-
es/scenes work. 
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Adrian GARGETT  
 
Nolan's Memento, Memory, and Recognition  
 
Perhaps it is possible to start with memory. With memories that are placed before the eye. What 
has been remembered here? In Christopher Nolan's film Memento (2000), although the recognisa-
ble becomes far distanced from the describable, it never becomes totally separable. The increasing 
frailty of reference the more tenuous those links, the more that becomes the subject matter itself. 
Reverberations, the chaos of multiplying associations (conscious and subconscious), memories of 
an already-known, especially an already-narrated the traces of a describable, all conspire towards 
the instability of what is assumed to be perceived. Memory thus not as a pleasant reverie but as 
anarchic.  
In an unstable creation where fugitive chains of associations undermine a hold on perception, 
repetitions of all kinds are a provisional order. Interruptions, shifts and collapsings of endless re-
currence move considerations from the spatial to an unfolding of time. Repetition is itself a meta-
phor since nothing can be repeated. Some thing is always surrogate for something else. Temporar-
ily speaking, actions extend backwards in memory and forwards in expectation. They can never 
coincide. So repetition automatically engages with duration, and more particularly duration attend-
ed to -- time that makes itself not invisible. Time structures via repetition in a one plus one sense, 
a molecular sense, hence its form making capacity. Repetition's simultaneous capacity to order 
and disorder, neither less anarchic, its attendant meaning no less so. The narrative is structured in 
a one plus one molecular way, but a form -- that which is differentiated, knows where to stop. 
Some other process or event limits or changes that multiplication. It differentiates the undifferen-
tiated or deconstructs that form that limits.  
Residues of past disturbances forever bear their trace. Present and potential events register 
cause, effecting new casual repercussions.  As imprints of an event, representations present evi-
dence of time and contingencies to come. The narrative line changes form, but there is no possibil-
ity of unravelling such chains of complexity. The interchangeability of cause and effect -- the inde-
cipherable -- produces acute anxiety, haunting the narrative. This failure to mediate meaning in-
duces deep insecurities as to the attaining of significance. "I suppose I was looking for Marlowe's 
ghost in modern L.A.": What if the grasp of one's life story were incomplete through neurological 
disorder? It is this problem which is excellently dramatised in Memento. Nolan's film is probably 
the first film about a revenger -- here of a raped, murdered wife -- who can only glory in his 
bloody vengeance for a matter of seconds because he has lost his short-term memory. Because 
the artificial style in which the story is presented identifies it as a fiction, its status as a creation of 
the human imagination can become its subject. The film proposes an ironic re-interpretation of the 
private-eye genre in which the conventional pattern of heroic self-determination played out by 
Leonard Shelby is contradicted by a self-conscious critique of the formula carried by the film's 
structure, a critique that sees the hero's control over his world as an illusion.  
In his celebrated private-eye manifesto The Simple Art of Murder, Raymond Chandler contrasts 
Dashiell Hammett's putative realism with the artificial contrivances of the classical detective story. 
As Chandler saw it, "Hammett gave murder back to the people who commit it for reasons, not just 
to provide a corpse; and with the means at hand, not with handwrought duelling pistols, curare, 
and tropical fish.  He put these people down on paper as they are, and he made them talk and 
think in the language they customarily used for these purposes" (16). In contrast to Chandler's 
emphasis of realism, Nolan's version of the formula involves the nostalgia of noir as a means of 
undercutting the generic experience itself. In Memento, Nolan evokes the basic characteristics of a 
traditional genre deliberately in order to bring the audience to see the genre as an embodiment of 
an inadequate and destructive myth. Although Memento features a milieu that is ostensibly realis-
tic, its self-conscious visual style qualifies this assumption.  
The protagonist is an insurance investigator and what the reverse chronology of the movie bril-
liantly achieves is the ironic, gradually unfolding suspicion that the loss of short-term memory can 
be a semi-willed insurance policy as well as brain damage. A series of overlapping timed sequenc-
es each offer us a more complicated view of the protagonist's history. Memento understands that 
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one method of communicating the behaviour of memory is to create a parallel activity for the au-
dience to experience. For once the "objectivity" of the reverse chronological sequence convention 
feels both legitimate artistically and morally creepy because we repeatedly have access to the im-
mediate past which our hero's brain crucially denies him.  
"We drove out Highway 70 and started moving past the trucks into rolling ranch country. I was 
driving; Degarmo sat moodily in the corner, his hands deep in his pockets. I watched the fat, 
straight rows of orange trees spin by like the spokes of a wheel. I listened to the shine of the tires 
on the pavement and I felt tired and stale from lack of sleep and too much emotion" (Chandler, 
The Lady in the Lake 158) ... "There are no individual statements, there never are. Every state-
ment is the product of a machinic assemblage, in other words, of collective agents of enuncia-
tion  (take ‘collective agents' to mean not peoples or societies but multiplicities). The proper name 
(nom propre) does not designate an individual, it is on the contrary when the individual opens up 
to the multiplicities pervading him or her, at the outcome of the most severe operation of deper-
sonalization, that he or she acquires his or her true proper name. The proper name is the instan-
taneous apprehension of multiplicity" (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus 37-38). "Cine-
ma," writes Deleuze, "does not give an image to which movement has been added, it immediately 
gives us the movement -- image" (Cinema 1: The Movement Image 215). This is not so much time 
frozen, but time infinitely speeded up, not so much movement arrested as movement anticipated.  
Anticipation functions predominately throughout Memento. The narrative may be seen as an in-
determinate map in which conceptual and material "densities" co-exist offering new models for the 
use of textual/filmic information. The narrative lines which flow through the film are partial maps 
which only imperfectly predict perceptual experience. They play with instrumentality at the same 
time they use instrumentality to disrupt the conventions of narrative. The chaotic universe in 
which the viewer is submerged is on the verge of collapse. One consequence of this collapse is that 
it is no longer clear what is and is not a sign. The perceptual space of the film is not simple and 
homogeneous: there are rifts and inexplicable transitions, abrupt appearances and disappearances 
which set up indeterminate conditions and render information segments incomplete and tentative. 
They effect a kind of blockage, making the narrative go blank right at the moment when conven-
tional composition would dictate some kind of resolution. The structure of  Memento is deter-
minedly non-linear.  The same sequences are seen from difference viewpoints, alternatively clari-
fying and confusing perceptions. It is edited like a random selection of mosaic tiles, but when the 
last section eventually snaps into place, a surprise sets the whole intrigue in motion again.  
In Cinema 2 Deleuze works towards a re-inscription of temporality across every element of film. 
According to Gilles Deleuze, this new image, this new mutation strives to become "truly thought 
and thinking, even if it has to become 'difficult' in order to do this": "What is in the present is what 
the image 'represents,' but not the image itself, which ... the system of the relationships between 
its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows" 
(Cinema 2: The Time Image xii). Deleuze indicates the malleable quality of time in cinema where 
"sheets" of past can co-exist in a non-chronological order. The question then becomes: not how 
are Forms extracted from or released in things, but under what conditions can something new or 
singular be produced "outside" them? This concept of the abstract Deleuze develops along with 
Guattari with the "abstract machine" -- opposed to the abstract in the ordinary sense -- the "And" 
which moves outside. To move from the primary/critical sense of the abstract to this second "af-
firmative" version is to transform the idea of the abstract.  For as long as one regards the abstract 
as Form withdrawn from Matter, one things in terms of ‘possibilities' and their  ‘realizations' (or 
transcendental or dialectical conditions of such possibility).  The basic assumption remains that the 
world is logically congruent with possibilities given by abstractions, even if all such possibilities are 
not realised or instantiated or all the categories under which they fall are not known. But once one 
allows for a world that is dis-unified, incongruous, composed of multiple divergent paths, one can 
think of abstract "virtualities" which in contrast with abstract "possibilities," are quite real, even 
though they are not "actualised." One starts to see the force or potential of things for which there 
exists no abstract concept, since their "effectuation" would go off in too many directions or "sens-
es" at once. In Dialogues, Deleuze and C. Parnet call such potentials "virtual" (64-84). Thus, the 
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virtual may be said to be abstract in a different sense from the possible: abstract machines are 
said to be real although not concrete, actual although not effectuated. They have the abstraction 
of immanent force rather than transcendental form -- the abstract virtuality within things of other 
different things, of other possible worlds in our world, other histories in our history.  They are 
rhizomatic, serial, differential, complications rather than categorical generalising and purifying.  
It is this concept of the abstract that Deleuze applies to cinema. If he sees films as abstract it is 
not because they remove all narrative or digesis and retreat into pure filmic self-reference, but 
because they take singular elements from all over, past and present, and reassemble them, mixing 
them up in the strange non-narrative continuity of a sort of  "abstract machine." The motivation is 
thus not the removal or absence of narrative, but an attempt to attain an "outside" of other enig-
matic/strange connections through a free, abstract And, which takes over the movement and time 
of the film. One must put this sort of abstraction first, see it as first, and so take narration as only 
"an indirect consequence that flows from movement and time, rather than the other way around" 
(Cinema 2: The Time-Image 222-23).  For film is not a "code" of which abstraction would be the 
self-reference; it is an abstract machine that has movement and time as specific abstract 
"virtualities" which then get "effectuated" in particular conditions -- narrative is only one restricted 
possibility.  
A significant process in the Deleuzian "time-image" is the "recollection-image" (an actualisation 
of a virtuality) as in the life of the recollector, stretching the structure of the film, fragmenting its 
linearity. It does not give us the past, "but only represents the former present that the past 'was'" 
(Cinema 2: The Time-Image 54). This effect can be seen in the memory sections of Memento 
where these images are moving the narrative back and forth through virtual time spaces. The im-
mediate now presence of the cinema is perfect for the form of the recollection-image, as, "it is in 
the present that we make a memory, in order to make use of it in the future when the present will 
be past" (Cinema 2: The Time-Image 55). Developing this image analysis Deleuze recognises two 
possible types of time -- image, one grounded in the past, the other in the present.  In this situa-
tion the past is preserved in time and should not be seen as un-actualised recollection-images: "it 
is the virtual element into which we penetrate to look for the 'pure recollection' which will become 
actual in a 'recollection-image'" (Cinema 2: The Time-Image 98). Deleuze derives this cinematic 
feature from his philosophic thought concerning the perception of memory: "Memory is not in us; 
it is we who move in a being-memory, a world-memory" (Cinema 2: The Time-Image 101). Via 
extrapolation Deleuze suggests that in film there are circles, or sheets of the past, which coexist 
between past and present, each sheet having its own characteristics, "accents" (peaks of view) 
and "aspects" (regions/layers): its "shining point" and its "dominant themes." Film can place us in 
the past, and then choose one of these sheets.  
When we are placed in a certain sheet of time, that time, whether it is past, present, or future 
"becomes" present. Thus, in a film such a Mement, the past/present/future are no longer in any 
semblance of succession, but are implicated simultaneously. The film is structured with separate 
and different sheets of time -- which for us become the different "presents" of the film, each sheet 
can then be contradicted, obliterated, substituted, re-created, and returned. Here in the peaks of 
the present, the time-image shows its signifying power to push the ineffable, to make "actual" 
placed "de-actualized" in being related and aligned with virtual sheets of the past. Memento's nar-
rative lines define and construct continuums within "memory-ages." What are unclear "flashbacks" 
become more like recollection-images of our independent memory world. With Memento Nolan 
creates a film which has one single character: thought. What Nolan achieves is a utilization of the 
concept and feel of memory without impoverishing it by simply making it the object of flashbacks. 
Thus the stretches of sheets of past can just as viably be false recollections or imaginations or a 
past that is forgotten but that we have been given access to -- an opening up of "past" and there-
fore "time" in the film.  
The feelings of Leonard Shelby are spread over different sheets of the past, forming an inter-
locking sheet of their own. The film goes beyond the central character's construction towards feel-
ings and beyond feelings towards the thought of which his is a character. Shelby is thus a charac-
ter "of" thought, of film-thought. In the opening sequences of Memento sections of scenes appear 
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later to re-appear in a wider context to form a more cohesive whole and thus become an echo of 
an earlier echo of what was to come. From a basis in space and movement the image has moved 
to occupy topological schemes centering on time and thought, and in Deleuzian terminology the 
screen has become "the cerebral membrane where immediate and direct confrontations take place 
between the past and he future ... independent of any fixed point" (Cinema 2: The Time-Image 
126).  
Deleuze's "crystalline image" encompasses de-actualized peaks of the present and virtual 
sheets of past actually "describing" the setting being a "cinema of the seer" (Cinema 2: The Time-
Image 137). This form develops into crystalline narration, of pure optical and sound situations, 
with sequence takes over from sensory-motor montage, and wherein movement is "zero" or "in-
cessant" such that the anomalies of movement become the essential point. This is part of the 
scheme of the time-image from which movement derives, which is then "false movement" pro-
duced by direct time-images, and thus non-chronological time (movement = time, false time 
therefore false movement). Deleuze positions the power of the "false" at the centre of a new style 
of cinema. This falsifying narration structures Memento. The elements of Nolan's film change con-
stantly with the relations of time into which they enter and the terms with their connections. This 
regime of the image works to arrest the presupposition of reality, stops narration vainly attempt-
ing to refer to a true/correct form, and replaces these with the cinematographic "powers of life." In 
Nolan's private-eye story the hero's position as spectator is not always a privileged one. Converse-
ly, in the Deleuzian scheme objective and subjective images are stripped of their division and iden-
tification in favour of a new circuit where they are completely replaced, or contaminate each other, 
or are decomposed and recomposed. Thus in Memento the image (op and son; image and sound) 
in echoing that to come, includes the before and after and also the personal and impersonal in one 
present. This practice is the process via which the direct time-image, breaking with indirect repre-
sentation and the flow of time feeds a free indirect discourse, operating in reality.  
Since the rape and murder of his wife, former insurance investigator Leonard Shelby has no 
short-term memory. Having vowed to seek out and kill his wife's murderer whose initials he knows 
to be "J.G." and whose car-registration number he has tattooed on his body, he writes notes and 
takes Polaroid pictures to remind him how the investigation is progressing. The story unfolds in 
reverse chronology:  
 
L.A. Shelby sits on his bed in a shabby room at the Discount Inn motel, talking to an unknown person on 
the phone. 'You say we've talked before?' he mutters. 'I don't remember that ... Yeah, it was summer. I 
remember that. I remember everything up until my injury. I just can't make new memories. So I can't re-
member talking to you. What did we talk about?' He gets up from his bed and wanders through the bath-
room, the receiver tucked under his chin. 'Oh Sammy Jankis. I guess I told you about Sammy to help you 
understand. Sammy's story helps me understand my own situation. He paces around the bathroom. 
'Sammy wrote himself a tremendous amount of notes, but he got mixed up. I have a more graceful solution 
to the memory problem.' He begins to undo his shirt; his upper body is covered in tattoos of names and 
date. 'I'm disciplined, and organised. I use habit and routine to make my life possible, Sammy had no 
drive. No reason to make it work.' In the bathroom mirror, we see Shelby remove his shirt, across his chest 
in a huge tattoo. It read JOHN G RAPED AND MURDERED MY WIFE, Shelby stares at his reflection for a se-
cond before continuing his conversation. 'Me? Yeah ... I got a reason'. 
 
The implications of Nolan's self-conscious view of fantasy/memory are most fully expressed in the 
way he depicts his hero. As a detective, Leonard Shelby embodies the values such heroes repre-
sent. He aspires to actions on a grand scale, ostensibly motivated by ideals of cour-
age/justice/altruism. By self-consciously playing against the "hard-boiled" formula's realist preten-
tiousness; however, Nolan at a deeper level calls these values into question. In Memento the pri-
vate-eye mythology is revealed as inadequate and destructive. Primarily, Memento is a detective 
story, as Leonard makes clear to the undercover cop Teddy, who claims to be helping him to track 
down his wife's killer. "Facts," he says, "not memories. That's how you investigate." Keeping track 
of his search with scribbled notes, clues tattooed on his body and sheaves of documents, Leonard 
anchors his investigation in what he believes are concrete givens. But each time, the film reveals 
the context for his suppositions, Leonard is shown to be mistaken. Memento progresses to decon-
struct the noir genre -- a remarkable psychological-puzzle film, a crime conundrum that expands 
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the narrative possibilities of noir, and in the film its detective hero Leonard Shelby turns into a sur-
rogate for the spectator, the reverse narrative logic forcing us to embark on the kind of investiga-
tive work Shelby is engaged in. Memento, in contrast to earlier versions of the genre in which the 
narrative was constructed to validate the hero's values, concludes by revealing them as paranoid 
projections cloaking the protagonist's own sense of impotence in the face of the byzantine com-
plexity and evil of modern life.  
Nolan engenders the genre's tendency to confound our expectations, with the conceptual twist 
of linking the flow of narrative information to Leonard's mental condition. One of the ways Leonard 
attempts to navigate the series of unconnected instants that constitute his experience of time is by 
taking Polaroids. Each image has a scribbled addenda: Teddy's reads "Do not believe his lies" the 
picture of Natalie, the waitress Leonard hooks up with, has "She's lost someone too. She'll help 
you out of pity." For Leonard and the viewer these memory cue-cards are clues in the murder hunt 
but there is substantial and detailed evidence positioned throughout the film's convoluted narrative 
structure to suggest that Leonard's "facts" do not necessarily relate the complete story: needing to 
assert his own sense of power and control over a threatening world, Shelby constructs repeatedly 
theories from inadequate and ill-digested information and these theories are invariably at odds 
with the actual situation, making him ultimately responsible for the disaster that concludes the 
action. His vulnerability and "moral" deformity appear metaphorically in his neurological condition:  
 
In his room at the flea-bitten Discount Inn motel, Shelby pieces together photographic fragments of his life 
on a wall-sized map of the City tacked above his bed. First he produces a Polaroid of he motel itself. 
'Discount Inn.' He sticks the photograph to the map. Then a picture of a young brunette woman. 'Natalie.' 
That too is attached to the map. Next Shelby produces a photograph of a polished silver Jaguar. 'My car.' 
He glances up at the Polaroid of a middle-aged man, pinned to a far corner of the map. Shelby reads from 
the bottom of the picture 'Teddy.' Getting down from the bed, he glances at a photo copy of a driver's li-
cence on his chest of drawers. The same man peers out from the mugshot at the top of the page. Shelby 
notices his name. 'John Edward Gammel.' He looks perplexed then quietly angry. 'This guy told me his 
name was Teddy.' Standing on his bed again, Shelby pulls down the picture of Teddy/Gammel, and turns it 
over. Taking a felt pen, he writes in capitals on the white plastic strip on the back of the picture 'DON'T BE-
LIEVE HIS LIES'. 
  
L.A.'s grid-like network of streets makes it easy to get close to your destination, but very difficult 
to locate it precisely. Most side streets look the same and sometimes when you?re just a couple of 
blocks away you might as well be in another universe. Memento is like a filmic jigsaw puzzle which 
enlists the spectator's imagination in assembling the fragments supplied by the narrative, but 
which also provides its own "solution" at the end. On Natalie's Polaroid, for example, a line has 
been scribbled out, a detail that instils doubt about her faithfulness long before it becomes clear 
she is exploiting mercilessly Leonard's condition for her own ends. In the best noir tradition its 
hard to trust any of the characters.  
The film's opening sequence establishes the narrative pattern: a hand holds up a Polaroid pho-
tograph of a murder scene which slowly un-develops, fading to darkness. Subsequently a murder 
plays in rewind -- the victims blood seeps up a wall back into his head wound, bullet cartridges 
spin back into the gun's chamber -- erasing the act of killing. At this point the film reverts to a 
forward motion, events leading up to this murder are told in sequences that appear in reverse or-
der. Fragments of scenes which initially appear incomprehensible. It is only when the film loops 
out from small details to a larger context that the narrative line begins to form a more cohesive 
whole. Memento's prelude ushers the viewer into a wonderous piece which imitates brain function 
in itself being like a sizzle of connections across the collective synapses as it takes you on multiple 
detective trails into the past. Leonard's reliance on his remembered past -- he claims to recall his 
life before the murder of his wife -- is one of the films structural foundations. Running parallel with 
the fractured eternal present of the Leonard's real-time existence is the story of a case he investi-
gated when working for an insurance firm: that of Sammy Jankis, who was afflicted with similar 
short-term memory loss.  
In an extended black-and-white sequence, Leonard relates by phone (to a cop we assume is 
Teddy) how he was suspicious of Jankis who despite his condition could nonetheless administer the 
correct insulin doses to his diabetic wife.  The claim was refused; Sammy's wife attempted to snap 
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her husband out of his amnesia by making him repeatedly inject her with insulin shots.  However 
this strategy fails tragically, leaving her dead and Sammy adrift in a memory-less limbo. Confined, 
like Leonard, in the film's looping reverse trajectory, we invest this sequence with validity.  Subse-
quent events come to undermine such verisimilitude: at gunpoint Teddy relates that he has com-
prehensively revised Leonard's memory of the Sammy Jankis case to avoid the facts that his own 
wife who survived the assault, died after he over-administered insulin to her. Jankis was a conman 
whom Leonard, in a psychological state of extreme denial, has reconstituted as a pitiful victim:  
 
The lobby of a cheap motel.  Shelby is greeted by his friend Teddy. 'Lenny.' Shelly turns unamused. 'It's 
Leonard. Like I told you before." 
Teddy holds the door open for him. 'Did you? I musta forgot.' 'I guess I already told you about my condi-
tion.' 'Ah well, only everytime I see you.' Outside, Teddy steps towards a car. Shelby sakes his head. 'My 
car.' 'This is your car.' 'Oh you're in a playful mood.' Shelby produces a Polaroid of his own car, a Jaguar. 
The real thing is parked next to the first car. 'It's not good for you to make fun of someone's handicap.' 
'Just trying to have a little fun.' In the Jaguar, the two men drive along a suburban road. Teddy turns to 
Selby. 'So, where to Sherlock?' 'I got a lead on a place.' Shelby produces another Polaroid. He hands it to 
Teddy. 'Oh, what the hell you want to go there for?' 
'You know it?' 'Yeah, it's just this fucked up building. Why'd you want to go there?' 'I don't remember.' 
Eventually they pull up outside the building. Teddy heads towards it. Shelby walks behind. He pulls another 
Polaroid from his pocket. It shows Teddy, smiling. He flips it over. On the reverse is written, in neat capital 
letters: DON'T BELIEVE HIS LIES. HE IS THE ONE KILL HIM. 
  
Teddy tells Leonard he is the cop who helped investigate the rape of his wife. Since the police 
dropped the investigation, Teddy has been finding criminals with the initials "J.G." for Leonard to 
kill. He elaborates this version of the narrative to a now distraught Leonard. The film's apex is to 
end with a questioning of its protagonists innocence: "Do I lie to myself to be happy?" Leonard 
asks after Teddy recounts his version of Catherine Shelby's death. "In your case Teddy, I will," he 
says as he writes down the cop's car-registration number, incriminating falsely him as his wife's 
killer and signing effectively his death warrant. It is the height of the film's achievement that this 
final scene -- which apparently completes the narrative jigsaw -- should cloud Leonard's motives. 
The conclusion is tantalisingly enigmatic, scattering any sense of certainty that may have become 
apparent during the multiple lines that comprise the narrative structures.  
In The Maltese Falcon Humphrey Bogart's explanation of events unlike Shelby's, does not re-
flect his own inadequacies; instead it is presented as an accurate re-creation of the actual state of 
affairs. Bogart is always right, and he always acts for the best. The "hard-boiled" formula is con-
structed to excuse the hero's behaviour by means of such rationalizations. Nolan's version of the 
story, however, allows no such refuge in thematic assertions of verisimilitude or morality. Faced 
with the condition of his own limited vision Shelby can only look confused and defeated: trapped in 
his destructive rationalizations and unable to comprehend  the insecurities that lie beneath them, 
he cannot imagine how he could have contributed to an alternative outcome: "The rains are over. 
The hills are still green and in the valley across the Hollywood hills you can see snow on the high 
mountains. The fur stores are advertising their annual sales.  The call houses that specialise in six-
teen-year-old virgins are doing a land-office business. And in Beverley Hills the jacaranda trees are 
beginning to bloom" (Chandler, "The Little Sister" 5).  
Deleuzian film theory engages a general consideration of the relationship between thought and 
film -- the image should "force thought to think itself as much as thinking the whole" (Cinema 2: 
The Time-Image 158). Memento acts as a type of intellectual stimulant that has the viewer deci-
phering a puzzle in process. Deleuze identifies the concept with image; the image is for itself in the 
concept. Violence, for example, should be of the image in its vibrations rather than in representa-
tion, while the notion of fractured perception should be brought out by composition. Thought is 
positioned as the object of the image, becoming the higher purpose of the essence of cinema. 
Deleuze suggests that cinema should not just film the world (narrow) but rather "belief" in this 
world (wide), for as in philosophy we should relinquish attempts to discover absolute truths and 
replace the model of knowledge with belief in the "crystalline image."  
The "interstice" between images in the time-cinema is vital -- a spacing which means that each 
image is extracted from the void and then reverts into it. The interstice is like a space/instant be-
Adrian Gargett, "Nolan's Memento, Memory, and Recognition"    page 8 of 9 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 4.3 (2002): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol4/iss3/3> 
 
tween images, and therefore an operation of "differentiation of potential" that engenders some-
thing new. These images break any join between them, a shock to get the viewer to choose living 
thinking over dead thought. A film such as Memento attempts to remove the reading of images by 
association (montage) which makes the succession of images into a chain, each slave in meaning 
to the next by a replacement with a division of this one-being mode of film for "the method of 
'and' this and that." This leads to irrational cuts engendering false continuity. The image itself be-
comes reflective, living. An attempt to mirror the process of thoughts is now replaced by the irra-
tional cut, and independent images, each deframing the previous, thus creating and inducing 
thought immediately in film and viewer: "The outside or obverse of the images has replaced the 
whole, at the same time as the interstice or the cut has replaced association" (Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image 214). Deleuze views cinema as being the highest exercise in thought, extracted from 
and in a sense integrated with the basic images and sounds. The time-image gives a direct repre-
sentation of time in its pure form. Movement-images are subsumed/subordinate to time. In the 
time-image aspects of the movement-image gain a new sense of montage/frame/sound take on 
the appearance of something "different" such that cinema becomes "analytic of the image": 
Deleuze's cinema is a plastic mass, an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material. What can film "essen-
tially" do? Deleuze re-inscribes cinema virtually with its own philosophical apparatus which comes 
to the fore in films such as Memento.  
What is identified in Memento is the way in which memory -- the work of memory -- is present-
ed by the way the film works.  Memory is not added on., it is already present. The Deleuzian ab-
stract quality does not lie in the negative relation to representation/externality/figure. It is there in 
the way memory is present. Abstraction is not present simply because memory lacks a given de-
termination, and thus all that is apparent in the film is memory in the abstract. Abstraction here 
means a particular type of filmic presentation. It is the employment of abstraction as an already 
determined form of film construction. This presentation and what allows the film to be abstract is 
the confrontation with the conventions of abstraction. Engaging with abstraction within abstraction 
must be understood in terms of the construction; in other words in terms of a response to the con-
struction/structure of the film, in which narrative/subject matter can only be identified with their 
emergence from the way in which particular sequences/scenes work. What is significant is that 
Memento affirms the presence of memory by holding and presenting memory within timed space; 
the dual presence of memory within the film forms part of the timing of space. Timed space is part 
of the way in which the film works.  
Film works in remembering in the abeyance of destruction and by figuring complex relations. 
Within the generalised field of film this relation may be generic, or it may involve the specific sub-
ject of the specific work. With Memento there is a dual work of memory -- two interrelated forms 
of memory are present. The first emerges as part of the film narrative itself. The film allows time 
and memory to figure as an essential part of the film's work. Both the structure and the narrative 
itself, enact different takes on the question of memory. It is thus that memory is already implicat-
ed in the work. It is this enactment that bring into play another aspect of memory. Here what is 
remembered and then played out is that particular manifestation of abstraction that is linked to 
negation and autonomy. The complex presence of the disjointed relation of sequences enacts a 
shattering of the notion of autonomy. 
Autonomy/immediacy/negation are not themselves subject to negation. It is alternatively that 
they are no longer appropriate to the way in which the film works. The fracture that results in their 
abeyance is effected by timed space. Timed space becomes the enactment of other abstrac-
tions/possibilities.  
The aesthetic gratuitousness of Memento is that of images swept away by a succession of 
unwielding neologisms: a retinue of visual replicants, ceaselessly modified refrains and circuitous 
re-configurations. Nolan demystifies and challenges noir through an exclamatory, puzzling, and 
unexpected filmic syntax that explodes into a cacophony of mixed metaphors that are at once dis-
continuous fragmented and fluid. In Memento he re-circulates different possibilities of the detec-
tive genre and we are exposed to a legacy gone askew. A world of unruly, seemingly haphazzard 
dissonances, mixing narrative directions, styles, and technical protocols distinctly punctuate the 
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film with excessive and translogical "break-outs" of form. Through a visuality suspended in ambiv-
alent quotation, or in elipses of eternal returns and departures Memento proposes a kind of acutely 
conscious, but also incidental nomadism, without guide across film form. Perturbed expressly this 
visuality enunciates a range of enigmatic and ambiguous variations, invoking double-edged, back-
and-forth-transformations as an inventive re-animation of film form. The dense, often difficult nar-
rative lines of Memento's rhizomatic inter-textualities retain an expressive dynamic -- a challenge 
to the encoded "I" (or eye) of presence. Strange and unreliable promissory narratives, they are 
fulfilled inasmuch as their finely tuned signing remains conflicted and in resistance to systematic 
categorisation. They are signed from within the paradox of mercurial and indivisible relations, and 
are liable to an uncertain outline of otherness.  
Memento is at once indebted to the history of the noir/detective genre and crediting its future 
inventively. The broken promise of a formalist structure and closure is also its rapporchement, a 
promissory value of otherness to the film form. Agitating hetero-referentiality in conflict between 
an inside and an imaginary outside, between specular immediacy and filmic distance, self-
referentiality, and self-reflectivity, between abstract and a-real, monologue and dialogue, abstract 
filmic intensities and rhetorical devices, Memento becomes a promissary address that invites dif-
fusely its creative impulses to participate in the invigoration of the film form.  
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